Times (London) - May 2, 2005
May 02, 2005
Leak shows 'Blair set on Iraq war a year before invasion'
By Michael Evans
The Prime Minister, eager to focus on more positive aspects of his
strategy in the final week of campaigning, cannot yet put Middle East
conflict behind him
IT WAS alleged yesterday that Tony Blair had decided on war with Iraq
nearly a year before the invasion, according to leaked Downing Street
documents.
The leak revealed what appeared to be minuted war preparations at the
highest level of government in July 2002, months before Mr Blair
received parliamentary approval for military action.However, Admiral
Sir Michael (now Lord) Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff at the time,
told The Times that no decision for war had been taken at that stage.
Military sources admitted that contingency planning for an invasion
of Iraq had begun in May 2002, a month after Mr Blair returned from a
meeting with President Bush in America about possible action against
Saddam Hussein's regime.
Military and intelligence officials said they were not given carte
blanche to prepare for war until "much later in the year".
Lord Boyce said: "It would have been irresponsible not to have
started making contingency preparations, but it was all done on a
what-if basis. We were not in any sense hell-bent on war. The main
thing was the diplomatic effort."
Lord Boyce spoke out after Downing Street minutes, marked "Secret and
Strictly Personal - UK eyes only", detailing a meeting about Saddam
Hussein in July 2002, were leaked to The Sunday Times. The minutes
referred to a meeting between Mr Blair and other key figures,
including Lord Boyce, Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of MI6, Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Goldsmith QC, the
Attorney-General, and Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary.
The minutes read: "This record is extremely sensitive. No further
copies should be made. The paper should be shown only to those with a
genuine need to know."
At that stage, Mr Straw's view was that the case for war was "thin",
and Lord Goldsmith was also giving warning of doubts about the
legality of going to war. Mr Blair is recorded as having replied: "If
the political context was right, people would support regime change."
Mr Straw came up with a possible solution. "We should work up a plan
for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN inspectors hunting
for weapons of mass destruction," he said. If Saddam refused, Mr
Straw argued, "this would help us with the legal justification for
the use of force".
In April 2002, Mr Straw told MPs that no decisions about military
action were likely to be made "for some time".
A leaked Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing paper prepared for
the July meeting made clear that Mr Blair told Mr Bush in April 2002
that Britain would support the US militarily to bring about Saddam's
downfall - although, on July 17, the Prime Minister told MPs: "No
decisions have yet been made."
A serving Whitehall official said it was wrong to suggest that final
decisions had been taken in the early summer of 2002, even if the
Prime Minister had offered to support the US. The official recalled
that in 1998 America and Britain were "literally an hour away" from
beginning air strikes after Saddam refused to co-operate with UN
inspectors. "But the bombing was called off after Saddam suddenly
agreed to let the inspectors do their work."
Lord Boyce backed up the official's claim that final decisions had
not been made until much later in 2002. "We were told we had to wait
for the diplomatic process to be exhausted and that Blair hadn't made
up his mind," he said."The doubts about Britain's involvement went
right up till the evening of the vote in the House of Commons a few
days before the invasion."
US doubts about Britain's participation remained so strong until the
last moment that Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, declared
that the US would go it alone if necessary.
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FACES
Downing Street memo of Prime Minister's meeting on Iraq, July 23, 2002
Jack Straw: "It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case
was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran"
Conclusions of the Iraq meeting: "We should work on the assumption
that the UK would take part in any military action . . . CDS (Chief
of Defence Staff) should tell the US military that we were
considering a range of options"
Tony Blair, July 16, 2002, replying to questions on preparing for
military action against Iraq: "No, there are no decisions which have
been taken about military action"
July 17, 2003, at Question Time: "However, we will make sure that
whatever we do, as I say constantly no decisions have yet been taken,
should be in accordance with international law"
July 24, Question Time: "As I have already said, we have not taken
the decision to commit British forces"
July 25, press conference: "I actually think we are all getting a bit
ahead of ourselves on the issue of Iraq. As I have said before,
action is not imminent; we are not at the point of decision"
----
Times (London) - May 1, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL- UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir
Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan
Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was
not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the
public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were
being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi
regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short
(72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south.
Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to
Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total
lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A
hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf
states were also important, but less vital. The three main options
for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps
with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying
down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken,
but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action
to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the
US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell
this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case
was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD
capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We
should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the
UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal
bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this
case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult.
The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN
inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it
was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different
strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context
were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues
were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel,
added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a
military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On
this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy,
there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should
explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play
hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He
cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the
ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set
out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in
any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning
before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US
military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds
could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the
week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the
background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum
to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
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